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  1Abstract 
The public provision of information about the environmental performance of firms and products 
has generated considerable enthusiasm and become a common instrument of environmental 
regulation, even though the economic analysis of the social welfare properties of these policies is 
quite limited.  This paper proposes a model for examining these properties. 
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  2Introduction 
 
Numerous governments, regulatory bodies and independent organizations have recently 
implemented a variety of programs designed to disseminate information about the environmental 
“attributes” of companies or products.  Some of the programs disseminate information about 
companies, but most focus on individual products.  Possible targets of the information include 
consumers, investors, voters, neighbors, and local public health and safety officials.  The nature 
of the information ranges from raw, technical data, to information that has been distilled into 
some form of label, grade or certification, such as eco-labeling and report card programs (we 
shall refer to these programs collectively as “environmental labels” or simply “labels”). 
  The popularity of environmental labels, and of information provision more generally, is 
due in large part to their appeal to a wide variety of constituents.  For libertarians and consumer 
rights advocates, information provision strikes a blow for citizens against both big government 
and big business.  For politicians and regulators, the absence of any requirement beyond 
disclosure limits confrontations with the regulated population.  For conservatives, it is free-
market environmentalism in (nearly) pure form.  For liberals, it provides a way for people to 
behave in a socially responsible way.  For the pragmatist, it is cheap, whether or not effective.  
For environmentalists, it is better than nothing, which is quite often the alternative. 
  Here, then, is the ultimate use of the market mechanism.  No one is obliged to act in any 
particular way or, indeed, to act at all.  Nor, is any particular result ordained by the government.  
Products themselves, or the processes by which they are made, may, but need not, be changed.  
And consumers need not opt for the environmentally "better" product.  However, if they do, one 
result may be a sort of "warm glow," a bonus not unlike that produced by participating in 
  3voluntary recycling or a morning spent cleaning public areas such as highway verges.  It may 
also be possible that those who do not choose the environmentally superior product will suffer 
from some form of environmental guilt or diminished utility due to social stigma.  
  Best of all, information provision has been shown to "work" in the sense that publicly 
provided information seems to have influenced some private decisions, which, in turn, has 
arguably changed firms' environmental practices.  This evidence has been most highly developed 
in the case of a program providing information on individual manufacturing facilities or plants - 
the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory.  (See Konar and Cohen, 2001; Khanna, et al., 1998; Konar 
and Cohen, 1997; Hart and Gautum, 1996; and Hamilton, 1995).  However, there is also 
evidence that environmental labels have prompted changes in consumer behavior.  For example, 
using Danish consumer diary data, Bjørner, et al, found statistically significant levels of 
consumer choice of more expensive, eco-labeled laundry detergents and toilet paper brands.  
(Bjørner et al, 2003).  Other examples include studies of the introduction of dolphin-safe tuna 
labeling (Teisl, et al., 2002), electricity markets (Roe, et al., 2001a), and point-of-purchase 
information on laundry detergents (Henion, 1972).
2
  Thus, there are both a priori reasons for enthusiasm and some evidence of positive 
effects behind the push to use information provision as an alternative to more intrusive regulation 
or pricing in the environmental policy arena.  However, despite their popularity and the emerging 
empirical evidence of their effectiveness, there has been little analysis of the economic 
performance of these programs and how that performance is tied to the details of design.  To put 
  4this gap in perspective, it is useful to contrast environmental labels with other "market-based 
instruments," charges per unit (of pollution, or fish landings, or other environmental stressors) or 
marketable permits (to discharge so much pollution, or land so many tons of fish, etc.).  In these 
latter cases, years of research have laid an extensive foundation to allow policy analysts to tell 
policy designers, for instance, what they will have to know and do to achieve the least-cost 
solution to the common problem of meeting a politically chosen set of ambient environmental 
standards.  Much is also known about what these alternative policy instruments promise on other 
dimensions, such as the relative strengths of the spurs they provide to environment-friendly 
technical progress.  Further, a fairly rich vein of actual experience shows how the tension 
between a bureaucratic search for more control and the need of private participants for 
predictability can lead to unworkable designs.  Part of this work and experience existed in time 
to inform the great experiment with tradable SO2 discharge permits that began in the U.S. with 
the 1990 Clean Air Act. For example, the Fox River experiment with tradable permits to emit 
pollution to a river had been found to have some serious design flaws that would have made 
actual trades unlikely, even if the setting chosen had been more promising.  (See, David, 2003, 
for the history and facts; and, more generally, Dudek and Palmisano, 1988). 
  By comparison, with labels we are flying blind, or nearly so.  There is by now some 
knowledge of which choices of sponsorship, information form, and information content seem to 
lead to the largest responses (e.g., Teisl, et al., 2002; Roe, et al., 2001a and b; Kane, et al., 2000; 
Teisl, et al., 1999; OECD, 1997; and USEPA, 1994.).  But there is no basis for a priori 
                                                                                                                                                             
2  There are more studies analyzing programs that simultaneously convey information on both public and private 
product attributes, such as organic food (environment and health) and energy-conserving appliances (environment 
  5statements about whether, and if so, how, labeling programs can be cost-effective in obtaining 
desired environmental outcomes such as ambient quality standards, or whether they can be 
ranked even roughly on the scale of comparative size of the incentive they provide for technical 
progress.  In large part, this is because we lack a simple, successful model of how labels "work."  
In particular, while we know that some consumers are willing to pay more for goods labeled as 
environmentally friendly, we do not know why.
3 
  Consumer response to the provision of environmental information is especially intriguing 
because of the tantalizing market power wielded by informed, motivated consumers and because 
of the uncertainties surrounding this motivation.  As economists see it, there are essentially two 
possible explanations of this motivation.  First, consumers are behaving as rational decision-
makers by attempting to incorporate the effects of the degradation of the natural environment 
from the production of goods and services on their well-being into their consumption decisions, 
but mistakenly overestimating the impact of their individual consumption decisions.  After all, 
the environmental improvement any single consumer purchases for herself by buying a labeled 
laundry detergent, say, is vanishingly small, at best.
4  A second possibility is that some 
consumers simply have a preference for environmentally-preferable products because of their 
"public spirit" or the "warm glow" they receive from doing "the right thing," or what Sen, 1973, 
                                                                                                                                                             
and expense). 
3  In considering consumer motivation, it is important to distinguish between public and private concerns.  Thus, we 
can think of two quite different rationales for purchasing an ENERGY STAR® appliance - because reduced energy 
consumption saves you money (private) or because it reduces greenhouse gas emissions (public).  The former fits 
quite easily with common economic definitions of rationality, the second much less so. 
4  If an individual’s consumption decisions have no measurable effects on the ambient environment and the 
consumer realizes this fact, then whether or not the consumer is selfish (only concerned with his or her own well-
being) or “altruistic” (also concerned with other’s well-being) is irrelevant to their response to the provision of 
environmental information. 
  6called “commitment,” in which pursuit of an idea or principle overrides the simpler sort of self-
interested behavior.  While eminently plausible, this explanation poses a difficult challenge for 
economists as is it is singularly difficult to model in a way that allows for testable a priori 
predictions of actual behavior, when individuals are faced with choices involving "social" rather 
than "private" outcomes.  (But see Brekke, et al., 2003, for a promising beginning). 
  Even our models of how a firm will respond to the opportunity to obtain a label for its 
product are highly stylized and thus of limited usefulness in predicting how an actual labeling 
program, with actual consumers on the other side of the market, will turn out (e.g., Kirchhoff, 
2000).  Thus, we would like, but are not able, to predict the percentage of products labeled, 
percentage of total sales involving labeled products, and therefore the extent of the change in 
environmental stress.  Further, it would be useful to know where that change occurs, whether it 
builds or decays over time with enthusiasm for "the right thing", and what happens to product or 
process technology, and thus the label requirements, under the spur of the initial program. 
  In short, we know very little, as policy analysts, about how these popular instruments 
actually work.  One might be tempted to say we know so little that it is amazing they have been 
adopted at all.  But that would be to ignore the broad appeal of these instruments, particularly the 
political power of the claim that they represent the ultimate in non-coercive, truly market-based 
instruments after three and a half decades of coercion and dispute.  For the remainder of this 
paper we hope to broaden the understanding of the potential of environmental labels to satisfy 
the static efficiency concerns of economists. 
 
Product Labeling and Static Efficiency 
 
  7A more optimistic view of the “promise” of environmental labels than the one stressing lack of 
coercion, is that they have a potential advantage over more traditional policy instruments in that 
they can lead to a reduction in the environmental damage associated with a polluting good in two 
different ways.  First, like other forms of environmental regulation, labels could encourage 
manufacturers to improve the “environmental quality” of their products or production processes.  
While the incentive for such action provided by labels could come in several different forms,
5 we 
focus solely on the possibility that the labels may cause consumers to place a higher value on 
“environmentally superior” products and the possibility that firms might react to this change in 
consumer preferences by improving the environmental quality of their products.  Our supposition 
for the change in consumer preferences lies not on the basis that consumers are optimizing over 
ambient environmental quality,
6 but on the basis that consumers have a preference for 
environmentally friendly products: 
If a consumer buys an environmentally-friendly product he produces a positive 
externality and helps preserving the environment.  However, any individual 
consumer is likely to realize that his own impact on the environment is negligible.  
When he makes his own consumption decision, the overall state of the 
environment is in essence exogenously given.  It is aggregate, rather than 
individual, behavior which affects the environment, and the individual consumer 
has no leverage on what others will do. 
A possible explanation for the observed consumption pattern is that individuals 
consider environment-friendliness as a particular quality attribute of the products 
they buy.  In other words, consuming a variant with a high environmental quality 
is very much like any other quality attribute.  There certainly is an externality 
involved, but what matters from an individual consumer’s perspective is the 
                                                 
5 The introductory chapter provides an overview of these different possible forms. 
6 This approach was used in the model employed in Kennedy, Laplante and Maxwell (1994), to consider the effect 
of providing environmental information to consumers who could allocate their consumption between a “clean” and a 
“dirty” good.  Thus, consumer preferences for the environmentally superior good depend upon the extent to which 
their consumption degrades their own ambient environment.  The paper nicely illustrates the market failures that 
arise, not only because consumers fail to internalize the effect of their consumption on others, but also because they 
fail to internalize the effect of their acquisition of information on the effect of this consumption on others. 




While this is clearly far from satisfactory - since it assumes away the question of why 
consumers do what they do - it does allow us to examine the results of such actions in 
ways parallel to those of the existing instrument choice literature.  We can view the 
assumption as a place holder, with the place waiting for more good work to come out of 
the research into broadly altruistic actions by consumers. 
All of which points to the second possible way for information provision to lessen 
environmental damage; it allows consumers with preferences for environmentally 
superior goods to alter their consumption in accordance with these preferences, reducing 
the consumption of environmentally inferior goods and increasing the consumption of 
environmentally superior goods.  Thus, one might argue that environmental labels have 
the potential to open a second front in the regulation of environmental externalities – not 
only inducing manufacturers to produce cleaner products or employ cleaner processes, 
but also inducing consumers to purchase more of the cleaner products and less of the 
others (all without the need for government regulation in any formal sense, mind you).  
The possibility of changes in polluter output as well as abatement efforts suggests the 
                                                 
7 A similar approach is utilized by Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), who motivate green consumption by assuming 
that the level of cleaning technology employed by product manufacturers is an element in consumer utility functions 
and that consumers have identical preferences over this element, but differ in their marginal utility of money due to 
differences in income.  As a result, their model predicts wealthier consumers will choose the environmentally 
superior products.  Kirchoff (2000) also uses a product differentiation model to analyze the incorporation of 
environmental information into consumption decisions.  However, her focus is on the use of information provision 
as a monitoring device for firm assertions about the environmental quality of its product, which she treats as a 
credence good, or a good for which quality is unobservable to consumers even after purchase. 
  9need for a more general model than the type that is typically used in static efficiency 
analysis.  We propose such a model in the following section. 
   
The Model 
More traditional environmental policies attempt to affect change in ambient 
environmental conditions through either changes in industry output or changes in 
abatement efforts.  Since changes in industry output pose difficult questions of a general 
equilibrium nature, the models used to evaluate the static efficiency of environmental 
policies have traditionally taken both firm and industry output as given and considered 
emissions solely as a function of the level of abatement effort expended by the firm.  
However, environmental labeling – if it can affect both abatement efforts by firms and 
purchase decisions by consumers - requires a model that endogenizes individual firm 
output and considers the effects of changes in individual firm output on emissions and 
abatement costs.  We ignore the possibility of a relationship between individual firm 
output and consumer surplus to keep our analysis comparable to that of traditional 
environmental policy instruments and because of the difficulty in modeling the effect of 
environmental labels on consumer welfare.
8  The model is presented first in a “base case” 
scenario where we assume that the regulatory agency is free to independently vary 
abatement effort and the distribution of output among the firms to generate an efficient 
result.  We then restrict the model in accordance with the “traditional” assumption that 
  10output is given and analyze the static efficiency properties of the traditional regulatory 
instruments.  Finally, we consider an “environmental labeling case” where individual 
firm output is a function of the abatement efforts of all of the firms in the industry. 
 
The Base Case 
To incorporate changes in individual firm output, but avoid partial equilibrium concerns over the 
effect of changes in total output on the consumption and production of other goods, we allow 
individual firm output or market share, xi, to vary but assume perfectly inelastic total market 
demand









i, are assumed to be a decreasing function of abatement effort, qi. and an increasing 
function of output: 










Total firm abatement costs, Ci, are an increasing function of both abatement effort and output: 









For simplicity, aggregate environmental damages, D, are assumed to be equal to the aggregate 
level of emissions for this industry: 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 It is one thing to assume that consumers have these preferences; it is quite another to specify what they look like in 
any detail.  For example, do consumers of environmentally inferior products suffer disutility as a result of the 
provision of information? 
9 This assumption follows Cremer and Thisse (1999) and Tirole (1988), and amounts to assuming that, while 
information on environmental performance may affect relative demand for the different versions of the 






DE e q x
==
== ∑∑  
Static efficiency for this industry can be obtained by minimizing the sum of aggregate abatement 
costs and environmental damage over both firm choice of abatement and the allocation of output 
or market share among the firms: 
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where α is a constant meant to remind us of the need to translate environmental damages and 
firm costs into equivalent units.  We can rewrite this objective function in the form of a 
Lagrangian multiplier: 
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Assuming, for simplicity, that α = 1 and the presence of an interior solution, the solution of this 
optimization problem provides two distinct sets of first order conditions.  The first set - 
corresponding to optimization over abatement effort (the “Abatement Conditions”) – are familiar 
ones, requiring that the change in abatement costs associated with a change in abatement effort 


















The second set – corresponding to optimization over individual firm output (the “Output 
Conditions”) - requires that market share or output be efficiently allocated among the firms in the 
  12industry, such that the marginal social costs of an increase in the output of any one firm are equal 
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marginal public costs of an increase in output.  Given our assumption of perfectly inelastic 
demand, if these marginal private and public costs are equal and constant across all firms, then 
the Output Conditions will always be satisfied and the allocation of output will be irrelevant to 
social welfare.  If these marginal cost functions are identical but not constant, then the Output 
Conditions will be satisfied only when output is evenly distributed amongst the firms. 
By relaxing the assumption of fixed output, we have created a more general model that 
produces a more general set of efficiency conditions.  Now, let us consider two different subsets 
of this base case – where demand or output is assumed to be given – the “naive” or “traditional” 
case - and where demand or output is a function of choice of abatement level – the 
“environmental labeling” case. 
 
The Traditional Case 
For this case, the functional forms are exactly as in the base case, except that output is assumed 
fixed, or: 


















In this case, the optimization problem becomes: 
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Again, assuming α = 1 and an interior solution, the first order conditions are simply the 

















##   
Static efficiency, given fixed output, then requires that abatement levels are set where marginal 
costs equal marginal benefits (i.e., the reduction of marginal damages).  Thus, satisfaction of the 
efficiency conditions of this case will satisfy the efficiency conditions from the base case if the 
initial distribution of output happens to be the one that satisfies the Output Conditions from the 
base case, or if marginal social costs are equal and constant. 
 
The Environmental Labeling Case 
  14For the labeling case, we assume that each firm produces a single variety of a good and 
that the variety is differentiated only by its environmental quality or performance.  In the absence 
of an environmental information provision program, there is an asymmetry of information 
between firms and consumers, in which firms know the levels of the environmental attributes of 
their products, but consumers do not.  Although “clean” firms could release the information on 
their own, it is assumed that consumers would disregard it without third party verification.  Thus, 
unless a program exists, consumers behave as if they have lexicographic preferences, basing 
consumption decisions solely on the values of observable product attributes and, firm output is 
assumed to be independent of the level of abatement effort.  However, in the presence of an 
information provision program the information asymmetry is cured,
10 the market share or output 
of each firm is a function of the level of abatement of all of the firms: 
) , , ( n j i i i q q q x X " =  
Firm emissions are a function of abatement and output: 
)) , , ( , ( n j i i i i i q q q x q e E " =  
Firm costs are also a function of abatement and output: 
)) , , ( , ( n j i i i i i q q q x q c C " =  
Efficiency for this market (assuming away any utility consumers might derive from the 
consumption of the differentiated good) can be obtained by minimizing aggregate abatement 
costs and environmental damage:  
                                                 
10 We abstract from the issues presented by positive costs of acquiring and using the information. 
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These conditions consider not only the “direct effects” of a change in abatement effort on firm 
costs and emissions, which are captured in the first two terms in each condition (and are identical 
to the Abatement Conditions from the base case), but also the “indirect effects” that occur via the 
changes in the output of the different varieties as a result of the change in abatement effort of any 
one variety.  These indirect effects, which are represented by the last n terms in each condition, 
are, in aggregate, the sum of the marginal social costs of changes in individual firm output 
weighted by the change in each individual firm’s output associated with a change in the 
abatement effort.  If marginal private and public costs are constant and equal across firms, then 
these conditions will reduce to the Abatement Conditions from the base and traditional cases and 
the efficiency conditions of all three cases will be equivalent.   
Thus, in the traditional case there is a type of failure associated with our inability to 
optimize over output or market share, as it is assumed to be exogenous.  Environmental labels 
hold out some promise of allowing regulators to affect market share.  However, this promise is 
  16tempered by two considerations.  Successfully manipulating output requires knowledge of how 
consumers will respond to a change in abatement effort and how firms will respond to the 
consumer actions – both difficult propositions at best.  Even if an agency possessed this 
knowledge (along with the requisite information on marginal cost and damage functions), 
optimization in the information provision case is essentially a constrained version of 
optimization in the base case, where the constraint is that market shares are a function of 
abatement efforts.  Thus, a regulatory agency is not free to independently manipulate abatement 
and output, as in the base case.  This implies that the efficiency conditions from the base case are 
more general than those from the labeling case and satisfaction of the labeling conditions will not 
necessarily result in an outcome that is “as efficient” as an optimal outcome under the base case. 
An obvious question at this point is whether there is anything that can be said about how 
the conditions from the traditional and labeling cases compare with one another.  Both represent 
constrained versions of the base case in that they impose restrictions on firm output thereby 
reducing the number of regulatory levers from two (abatement and output) to one (abatement).  
However, they differ in the nature of the restriction they place on output – the Traditional Case 
assumes it is fixed, while the labeling case assumes it is a function of the abatement efforts of all 
of the firms in the industry.  In general terms, neither is more or less restrictive than the other and 
thus, neither case provides a set of conditions, the satisfaction of which, guarantees an outcome 
that is unambiguously superior to any outcome under the other. 
 
Conclusion 
  17The framework proffered in this Chapter has been used to show that there is no general, theoretic 
basis for concluding that the ability of environmental labeling to influence both product design 
and/or production processes and consumer choice of competing products holds more promise as 
a means of achieving static efficiency than more traditional market-based environmental policy 
instruments.  Thus, while the “deputizing” of third parties is the ultimate source of much of the 
political appeal of information provision, it would appear that it is also the source of much of the 
weakness of information provision as an instrument of environmental policy, at least when 
examined against the static efficiency criterion. This analysis should contribute to the 
understanding of the welfare properties of environmental labeling programs, which has lagged 
far behind the adoption of these programs.  However, this analysis is incomplete and suffers 
from the lack of satisfactory models of firm and consumer behavior; or, where those models do 
exist, guidance in choosing among them.  Further research, of both a theoretical and empirical 
nature, is needed.  Possible extensions of the analysis performed here include the incorporation 
of consumer utility in the social welfare function and the consideration of alternative or blended 
policies, such as a market-based incentive (e.g., tax or subsidy) with an environmental labeling 
program (e.g., a report card type of program).  
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